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 
Abstract—Considering that human-driven vehicles and 
autonomous vehicles (AVs) will coexist on roads in the future for a 
long time, how to merge AVs into human drivers’ traffic ecology 
and minimize the effect of AVs and their misfit with human 
drivers, are issues worthy of consideration. Moreover, different 
passengers have different needs for AVs, thus, how to provide 
personalized choices for different passengers is another issue for 
AVs. Therefore, a human-like decision making framework is 
designed for AVs in this paper. Different driving styles and social 
interaction characteristics are formulated for AVs regarding 
drive safety, ride comfort and travel efficiency, which are 
considered in the modelling process of decision making. Then, 
Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg game theory are applied to the 
noncooperative decision making. In addition, potential field 
method and model predictive control (MPC) are combined to deal 
with the motion prediction and planning for AVs, which provides 
predicted motion information for the decision-making module. 
Finally, two typical testing scenarios of lane change, i.e., merging 
and overtaking, are carried out to evaluate the feasibility and 
effectiveness of the proposed decision-making framework 
considering different human-like behaviors. Testing results 
indicate that this human-like decision making framework can 
make personalized decisions according to different driving styles.  
 
Index Terms—Decision making, human-like, autonomous 
vehicle, game theory, driver model, model predictive control. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ECISION making is a vital part of autonomous driving 
technology. According to the information provided by the 
environment perception module, proper driving behaviors 
are planned by the decision-making module and sent to the 
motion control module [1]. Therefore, decision making is 
usually regarded as the brain of AV and bridges environment 
perception and motion control. The driving performance of 
AVs is effectively affected by the decision-making module, 
including drive safety, ride comfort, travel efficiency, and 
energy consumption [2]. 
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Many methods have been applied to the decision making of 
AVs in recent years. A probabilistic model is widely used to 
deal with the uncertainties of decision making [3], [4]. In [5], a 
Bayesian networks model is applied to decision making, that 
considers the uncertainties from environmental perception to 
decision making. However, it is difficult to deal with complex 
and dynamic decision missions. The Markov Decision Process 
(MDP) is another common probabilistic model for decision 
making. In [6], a robust decision-making approach is studied 
using partially observable MDP considering uncertain 
measurements, which can make AVs move safely and 
efficiently amid pedestrians. In [7], a stochastically verifiable 
decision-making framework is designed for AVs based on 
Probabilistic Timed Programs (PTPs) and Probabilistic 
Computational Tree Logic (PCTL). In addition, the Multiple 
Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) method and the Multiple 
Attribute Decision Making (MADM) method are effective to 
deal with complex urban environment and make reasonable 
decisions for AVs [8], [9]. 
With the development of machine learning algorithms, 
increasing numbers of learning-based decision-making 
methods have been studied. In [10], a kernel-based extreme 
learning machine (KELM) modeling method is proposed for 
speed decision making of AVs. In [11], a support vector 
machine (SVM) algorithm is applied to automatic decision 
making with Bayesian parameters optimization. In [12], a 
stochastic MDP is used to model the interaction between an AV 
and the environment, and reinforcement learning (RL) is then 
applied to decision making according to the reward function of 
MDP. A human-like decision-making system is built based on 
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) in [13], which can adapt to 
real-life road conditions. Compared with DNNs and other 
learning algorithms, the RL method does not need large 
quantities of labeled data from drivers, as it is a self-learning 
framework that solves sequential decision-making problem by 
interacting with the environment [14]. A Q-learning (QL) 
decision-making method is proposed based on RL in [15]. 
However, the learning efficiency and generalization ability of 
QL need to be improved.  
Moreover, rule-based decision-making methods have been 
studied by many researchers, including fuzzy logic and expert 
system. In [16], a prediction and cost function-based algorithm 
is proposed to deal with the decision-making problem of 
highway driving for AVs. A decision-making approach using 
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fuzzy logic is studied to address automatic overtaking in [17]. 
Rule-based decision-making methods are easy to conduct, 
while the robustness of algorithms is poor.  
There are various driving scenarios for system design, 
algorithm evaluation, and performance verification of AVs. 
Considering that most traffic accidents on highways are caused 
by lane-change behaviors [18], lane change is regarded as a 
typical, common and potentially dangerous driving scenario to 
test AVs’ performances in many studies [19]-[21]. Therefore, 
lane change is also studied as a target driving scenario in this 
paper. 
Most of the aforementioned algorithms have been widely 
investigated to solve the lane-change decision-making problem 
for AVs. However, few of the algorithms consider the social 
interactions of vehicles in the decision-making process. Game 
theory is an effective approach to address this issue, especially 
under lane-change conditions [22]-[24]. A game theory-based 
lane-changing model is built in [25], which can make AV 
change lanes in a human-like manner. In [26], the interactions 
between the host vehicle and surrounding vehicles are captured 
in a game theoretic approach, which can make optimal 
lane-change decision to overtake, merge and avoid collisions. 
A lane-change model is conducted based on a game theoretic 
approach to address the cooperative control of connected 
vehicles through vehicle-to-vehicle communications [27].  
To consider the social interactions between the AV and 
surrounding vehicles, in this study, a human-like decision 
making framework for AVs is built. Different driving styles are 
defined for AVs to simulate human-like driving behaviors in 
the decision-making process. Then, the decision making of AV 
is transformed into a noncooperative game. Nash equilibrium 
and Stackelberg game theory are utilized to address this 
problem. In addition, potential field method and model 
predictive control (MPC) are applied to motion prediction and 
planning, respectively, which are used to predict 
collision-avoidance path for the decision-making module. 
Finally, the human-like decision making framework for AVs is 
verified via different testing scenarios. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section II, 
the problem description and human-like system framework are 
presented. Then, the integrated model combining the driver 
model and the vehicle-road model is built in Section III. In 
Section IV, the decision-making module is established based on 
noncooperative game theory. Moreover, the motion prediction 
and planning module is designed using the potential field 
method and MPC in Section V. Test results and analysis of the 
proposed approach are discussed in Section VI. Finally, Section 
VII concludes the paper. 
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND SYSTEM FRAMEWORK 
Different human drivers have different driving styles due to 
their individual differences, i.e., different drivers may make 
different decisions under the same condition. For instance, in 
terms of the emergency collision avoidance condition, 
aggressive drivers may choose a quick steering behavior and 
timid drivers may choose a quick braking behavior. 
Additionally, different passengers prefer different driving 
styles. For instance, babies, pregnant women and order people 
prefer a comfortable and safe riding experience. Couriers care 
more about travel efficiency on the road. Therefore, the 
decision-making framework for AVs should not be fixed and 
unchanged. Instead, it should be human-like and adaptable for 
different passengers. However, driving styles are seldom 
considered during decision making process in existing studies. 
For human drivers, driving styles are affected by both human 
factors and environmental factors, including physical 
limitations, habits, personality, age, road conditions, weather, 
etc. [28], [29]. In this paper, three driving styles are defined, i.e., 
aggressive, normal and conservative, which are used to design 
the human-like decision making framework for AVs. In general, 
aggressive drivers care more about the vehicle dynamic 
performance and travel efficiency. Namely, they would like to 
frequently rotate the steering wheel or step on the throttle and 
brake pedal. In contrast, conservative drivers give priority to 
driving safety and ride comfort. Therefore, they execute their 
actions very carefully. Normal drivers, wo are positioned 
between the above two driving styles, are likely to make a 
trade-off decision by considering travel efficiency, ride comfort 
and drive safety [30], [31]. 
With consideration of different driving styles, the 
decision-making framework for AVs is more human-friendly, 
which can provide personalized choices for different 
passengers in regard to drive safety, ride comfort and travel 
efficiency. Additionally, it can be expected that human-driven 
vehicles and AVs will coexist on the roads in the future for a 
long time. Safety is not the only requirement for AVs, how to 
merge into the traffic consisting of human drivers is another 
vital issue to be discussed. AVs should not behave too 
differently from surrounding human-driven vehicles. If AVs 
are human-like, surrounding human drivers can easily interact 
with AVs and predict their behaviors, particularly with regard 
to cooperative maneuvers. The aforementioned factors are the 
main reason that we want to design a human-like decision 
making framework for AVs. 
Furthermore, the human-like decision making framework of 
lane change for AVs is illustrated in Fig. 1. In the modeling 
process of decision making, three different driving styles are 
reflected as drive safety, ride comfort and travel efficiency. 
Then, noncooperative game theory is used to make proper 
decisions for AVs. In the modelling process of human-like 
driving, driver model is adopted to describe different driving 
styles. Combined with potential model method, MPC is applied 
for motion prediction and planning, which aims to predict 
collision-avoidance path for the decision-making module.  
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows. 1. 
Different driving styles and social interaction characteristics 
are formulated for AVs and are taken into consideration in the 
modeling process of decision making. 2. A human-like decision 
making framework is designed for AVs based on the driver 
model and noncooperative game, and Nash equilibrium and 
Stackelberg game theory are used to solve the noncooperative 
decision-making problem. 3. The potential field method and 
MPC are applied to motion panning for AVs, which provide 
predicted motion information for the decision-making 
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framework. 
 
Fig. 1.  Human-like decision making framework for AVs. 
III. MODELLING FOR HUMAN-LIKE DRIVING 
In this section, different driving styles are described in the 
driver model. Then, the combination of the driver model and 
vehicle-road model yields an integrated model for human-like 
driving, which is applied to the motion prediction of AVs. 
A. Driver Model 
Fig. 2 shows a single-point preview driver model, that is 
widely used in vehicle control [32]. In this paper, the model is 
applied to the motion prediction of AVs. In Fig. 2, point E is the 
current position of the driver.   is the yaw angle of the vehicle. 
M is the predicted point along the current moving direction of the 
vehicle in the future, which is predicted by the driver’s brain 
according to the vehicle states and position. P is the preview 
point created by the driver’s eyes, and consecutive preview 
points make up the planned path. The driver aims to minimize 
the distance between the predicted point and the preview point. 
Finally, the purpose is realized by controlling the steering angle 
of the front wheel. The aforementioned content describes the 
basic working principle of the driver model. 
 
Fig. 2.  Driver model. 
Considering the driver’s driving characteristics, the driver 
model is expressed as follows [33]. 
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where f  is the steering angle of the front wheel, a is related to  
the damping rate of the model, dT  and pT  are the driver’s 
physical delay time and predicted time, xv  is the longitudinal 
velocity of the vehicle, Y  and pY  are the lateral coordinate 
position of the vehicle and preview point, sK  is the transmission 
ratio of steering system, and sG  is the  steering proportional gain. 
The driver’s driving style or characteristic is reflected by dT , pT  
and sG . For instance, conservative drivers require more time 
for mental signal processing and muscular activation than 
aggressive drivers. Therefore, conservative drivers have larger 
dT . However, aggressive drivers have opposite reactions [34]. 
Referring to [35]-[37], the parameters that reflect different 
driving styles are selected in Table I. 
TABLE I 
PARAMETERS OF DIFFERENT DRIVING STYLES 
Parameters Aggressive Normal Conservative 
dT  0.14 0.18 0.24 
pT  1.02 0.94 0.83 
sG  0.84 0.75 0.62 
a  0.24 0.23 0.22 
To analyze the characteristic of the driver model with the 
different driving styles, the distance error between predicted 
point M and preview point P is denoted by Y , i.e., 
( )p p xY Y Y T v      . Then, the transfer function from Y  
to f  is derived as 
2 2( ) ( )1
s s
f
d d
K G
s Y s
aT s T s
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 
                     (2) 
According to Eq. (2), Fig. 3 presents the step response results 
of the driver model under the three different driving styles. It 
can be seen that the aggressive style has the fastest response 
speed and the maximum stable gain. By comparison, the 
conservative style has the longest response time and the 
minimum stable gain. The response result of normal style is 
between the above two driving styles. From the aforementioned 
analysis, it can be concluded that aggressive drivers usually 
control the steering wheel with a large amplitude and high 
frequency. However, conservative drivers show the opposite 
behaviors. 
  
Fig. 3.  Step response results of the driver model under the three driving styles. 
B. Vehicle-Road Model 
To reduce the complexity of the controller design, the 
four-wheel vehicle model is simplified as a two-wheel bicycle 
model [38], which is illustrated in Fig. 4.  
Assuming that the steering angle of the front wheel f  has a 
small value, it yields sin 0f  . According to Fig. 4, the 
simplified vehicle dynamic model is derived as follows [39]. 
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where yv  is the lateral velocity of the vehicle, and r  is the yaw 
rate. ( , )xiF i f r  and ( , )yiF i f r  denote the longitudinal 
and lateral tire forces of the front and rear wheels. fl  and rl  
are the front and rear wheel bases. m  is the vehicle mass. 
 
Fig. 4.  Bicycle model. 
If air resistance and tire rolling resistance are neglected, the 
longitudinal dynamics can be simplified as 
cos / /x xf f xra F m F m                           (4) 
With the assumption of a small tire slip angle, the 
relationship between the lateral tire force and the tire slip angle 
can be simplified as a linear relationship. 
= , =yf f f yr r rF k F k                             (5) 
where fk  and rk  are the cornering stiffness of the front and 
rear tires, respectively, and the slip angles of the front and rear 
tires f  and r  are defined by 
= ( ) / , =( )/f f y f x r y r xv l r v v l r v                (6) 
In addition, the vehicle kinematic model in global 
coordinates is expressed as 
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C. Integrated Model for Human-like Driving 
Combining the driver model and the vehicle-road model 
yields the integrated model for motion prediction. As Fig. 5 
shows, the integrated model has two inputs, i.e., xa  and pY . xa  
is the input of the vehicle-road model and pY  is the input of the 
driver model, which await solution. The outputs of the 
integrated model are the vehicle states and position, which are 
used for decision making and motion planning. 
 
Fig. 5.  Integrated model. 
According to Eqs. (1), (3) and (7), the integrated model for 
motion prediction is expressed as. 
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where the state vector [ , , , , , , , ]Tx y f fx v v r X Y    , and the 
control vector pu Y . 
IV. DECISION MAKING BASED ON NONCOOPERATIVE GAME 
THEORY  
In this section, modelling for lane-change decision making is 
conducted considering different driving styles. Then, Nash 
equilibrium and Stackelberg game theory are applied to the 
noncooperative decision making. In the modelling process, the 
lane-change behaviors of obstacle vehicles are not included, thus 
only acceleration and deceleration behaviors are considered for 
obstacle vehicles. 
A. Modeling for Lane-change Decision Making 
Fig. 6 shows a common lane-change scenario on a three-lane 
highway. Ego car (EC) is an AV moving on the middle lane, and 
lead car 2 (LC2) moves in front of EC with a small velocity. EC 
has to decide to decelerate and follow LC2 or change lanes, then, 
change to the left lane or the right lane, which is a 
decision-making problem. 
 
Fig. 6.  Lane-change decision making. 
 
Three performance indexes are taken into consideration in the 
modeling process of decision making, i.e., drive safety, ride 
comfort and travel efficiency. Therefore, the cost function of 
decision making for EC is the integration of these three 
components, which is expressed as 
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where ECdsJ , 
EC
rcJ  and 
EC
peJ  denote the costs of drive safety, ride 
comfort and travel efficiency, respectively. ECdsw , 
EC
rcw  and 
EC
pew  
are the weighting coefficients. 
The drive safety cost of EC is made up of two parts, i.e., the 
longitudinal drive safety cost and the lateral drive safety cost, 
which are related to the lead car (LC) and adjacent car (AC), 
respectively. Furthermore, drive safety cost EVdsJ  is defined by 
2 2 2=( 1) +EC EC ECds ds log ds latJ J J                          (11) 
where ECds logJ  and 
EC
ds latJ   denote the longitudinal drive safety 
cost and the lateral drive safety cost, respectively.  is the 
lane-change behavior of EC, { 1,0,1}:    {change left, no 
lane change, change right}. 
The longitudinal drive safety cost ECds logJ   is a function of the 
longitudinal gap and relative velocity with respective to LC, 
which is defined by 
2 2
- , ,= / [( ) ] / [( ) ]
EC EC EC EC EC EC
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where ,
LC
xv   and ,
EC
xv  denote the longitudinal velocities of LC 
and EC, respectively. ( , )LC LCX Y   and ( , )
EC ECX Y  are the 
positions of LC and EC, respectively. -
EC
v log and ECs log   are the 
weighting coefficients.   is a very small value to avoid zero 
denominator in the calculation. vl is a safety coefficient 
considering the length of the car.   denotes the lane number, 
{1,2,3}:  {left lane, middle lane, right lane}. 
The lateral drive safety cost ECds latJ  is associated with the 
longitudinal gap and relative velocity with respective to AC, 
which is expressed as 
2 2
- , ,= / [( ) ] / [( ) ]
EC EC EC EC EC EC
ds lat v lat x s lat xJ v s                   (13a) 
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where ,
AC
xv   is the longitudinal velocity of AC, ( , )
AC ACX Y      is 
the position of AC, -
EC
v lat and ECs lat   are the weighting 
coefficients. 
The ride comfort cost ECrcJ  is directly related to the 
longitudinal acceleration and lateral acceleration, which is 
defined by 
2 2 2
, ,= ( ) ( )x y
EC EC EC EC EC
rc a x a yJ a a                           (14) 
where ,
EC
xa   and ,
EC
ya  are the longitudinal acceleration and lateral 
acceleration of EC. 
x
EC
a and y
EC
a are the weighting coefficients. 
The travel efficiency cost ECpeJ  is associated with the 
longitudinal velocity of EC, which is expressed as 
2 max
, , , , ,=( ) = min( , )
EC EC EC EC LC
pe x x x x xJ v v v v v     ，                (15) 
where max,xv   is the velocity limit on the lane  . 
Furthermore, the cost function for AC has a similar expression, 
which will not be introduced repeatedly. Two differences are 
noted. First, since it is assumed that AC does not change lanes 
and only assumes acceleration or deceleration behavior, the 
lateral drive safety cost of AC is equal to the lateral drive safety 
cost of EC. The ride comfort cost of AC only comes from 
longitudinal acceleration. 
As mentioned in Section II, three different driving styles, i.e., 
aggressive, normal and conservative, are defined to describe the 
social behaviors of AV. In the modelling process of decision 
making, the differences between the different driving styles are 
reflected to different settings of weighting coefficients, i.e., ECdsw , 
EC
rcw  and 
EC
pew , which are related to drive safety, ride comfort 
and travel efficiency. Referring to [30], [31], the weighting 
coefficients of the three driving styles are shown in Table II. 
TABLE II 
WEIGHTING COEFFICIENTS OF THE DIFFERENT DRIVING STYLES 
Weighting Coefficients Aggressive Normal Conservative 
EC
dsw  10% 50% 70% 
EC
rcw  10% 30% 20% 
EC
pew  80% 20% 10% 
B. Noncooperative Decision Making Based on Nash 
Equilibrium 
In common lane-change scenarios, the game problem occurs 
between EC and AC, which is a 2-player game problem. The 
noncooperative decision making based on Nash equilibrium for 
two players can be expressed as 
,
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x x x
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min max min max
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min max min max
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where ,
EC
xa 
  and ,
AC
xa  

  are the optimal longitudinal 
accelerations of EC and AC,    is the optimal lane-change 
behavior of EC, min, ( , )x ia i      and max, ( , )xa i      are 
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the minimum and maximum boundaries of longitudinal 
acceleration, min, ( , )x iv i      and max, ( , )xv i      are the 
minimum and maximum constraints of longitudinal velocity. 
If there are two ACs on the left and right lanes respectively as 
Fig. 6 shows, Eq. (16) should be rewritten as 
,
, 1 2
( , )
( , ) arg min [ , ]
EC
x
EC
x
a
a J J

 
 

                       (17a) 
, ,1 1 , ,2 2{( , ), ( , )}
EC EC
x xa a                           (17b) 
1
, ,1 1
1
1 , ,1 1 ,
,
min ( , , )
EC
x
EC EC AC
x x
a
J J a a

  
                      (17c) 
2
, ,2 2
2
2 , ,2 2 ,
,
min ( , , )
EC
x
EC EC AC
x x
a
J J a a

  
                    (17d) 
11 1
, 1
1 1 1
, , ,1 1 ,= arg min ( , , )AC
x
AC AC EC AC
x x x
a
a J a a
 
    


                (17e) 
22 2
, 2
2 2 2
, , ,2 2 ,=arg min ( , , )AC
x
AC AC EC AC
x x x
a
a J a a
 
    


               (17f) 
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2
min max min max
, ,1 , ,2 , , , ,1 , ,2 , ,
1 min max 1 min max
, , , , , ,
2 min max 2
, , , , ,
s.t. , [ , ], , [ , ]
[ , ], [ , ],
[ , ], [
EC EC EC EC
x x x x x x x x
AC AC
x x x x x x
AC AC
x x x x x
a a a a v v v v
a a a v v v
a a a v v
       
           
         
     
    
 
 
 
,
2
min max
,
1 2
, ]
, { 1,0,1}.
xv  
 

 
，
 
C. Noncooperative Decision Making Based on Stackelberg 
Equilibrium 
In addition to Nash equilibrium, Stackelberg game is another 
noncooperative game approach [40], [41]. In Nash equilibrium, 
EC and AC are two equal and independent players. In the solving 
process, both EC and AC aim to minimize their own cost 
functions of decision making without considering the opponent’s 
decision-making results. However, in Stackelberg equilibrium, 
EC is a leader player and AC is a follower player, the behavior of 
AC will affect the decision making of EC. Applying Stackelberg 
equilibrium into lane-change decision making, it yields  
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Similarly, if there are two ACs on the left and right lanes 
respectively as Fig. 6 shows, Eq. (18) should be rewritten as 
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V. MOTION PREDICTION AND PLANNING BASED ON THE 
POTENTIAL FIELD MODEL METHOD AND MPC 
The potential field method is able to deal with the dynamic 
modeling of obstacles and roads, which is an effective method 
for motion planning. In this section, the potential field method is 
combined with MPC to predict the motion states and 
collision-avoidance path for the decision-making framework. 
A. Potential Field Method for Collision Avoidance 
The integrated potential field function of obstacle cars (OCs) 
and roads is expressed as 
1 2
1 1
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
n n
oc r
i j
i j
X Y X Y X Y
 
                      (20) 
where 1n  and 2n  are the numbers of OCs and lane lines, 
respectively. OCs include LVs and ACs. 
( , )oc X Y  is the potential field function of the OC at the 
position ( , )X Y in the global coordinates, which is defined as 
follows [42]. 
( , ) exp( )oc ocX Y a                              (21) 
where 
2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
= , / ,
2 2 2 2 2
ˆ ˆ1 0 cos sin
= , .
ˆ ˆ sin cos1 0
b
oc oc
x
X Y X X Y
oc oc oc
oc
oc oc oc
X Y X X Ycv k
X X X X
k
Y YX Y
  
    
 
 
       
  
                      
，
，
      
( , )oc ocX Y  is the CoG (center of gravity) position of OC. oca is 
the maximum potential field value of OC. X  and Y are the 
convergence coefficients. oc  and  ocxv  are the heading angle 
and longitudinal velocity of OC. b is the shape coefficient. 
( , )r X Y  is the potential field function of the road, which is 
defined by 
†( , ) exp( +0.5 )r rX Y a d d W                       (22) 
where ra is the maximum potential field value of the road, d is 
the minimum distance from the position ( , )X Y  to the lane line, 
†d  is the safety threshold value and W is the width of OC. 
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B. Motion Prediction Based on MPC 
To conduct motion prediction using MPC, the integrated 
model, i.e., Eq. (9) is transformed into a time-varying linear 
system. 
( ) ( ) ( )t tx t A x t B u t                               (23) 
where the time-varying coefficient matrices are given by 
, ,
= , =
t t t t
t t
x u x u
f fA B
x u
 
 
                        (24) 
Furthermore, Eq. (23) can be discretized as 
( 1) ( ) ( )
( ) ( 1) ( )
k kx k A x k B u k
u k u k u k
  
    
                     (25) 
where  ,tA TkA e
  
0
t
T A
k tB e B d
 

  ， T is the sampling time,
, , ,( )=[ ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ),
EC EC EC EC EC EC EC
x y fx k v k v k r k k X k Y k k       
, ( )]
EC T
f k , ,( )= ECpu k Y  , ,( )= ECpu k Y   . 
In addition, the output vector is defined by 
1 2 3( )=[ ( ), ( ), ( )]
Ty k y k y k y k , where 1( )y k  is the  potential field 
value associated with the  predicted position of EC, i.e., 
1( ) ( ( ), ( ))
EC ECy k X k Y k   , and 2 ( )y k  and 3( )y k are the lateral 
distance error and yaw angle error between the predicted position 
of EC and the center line of the lane  , respectively. 
Moreover, the predictive horizon pN  and the control horizon 
cN  are defined, p cN N . At the time step k, the sate sequence, 
output sequence and control sequence are given by 
( 1 | ), ( 2 | ), , ( | )px k k x k k x k N k                  (26a) 
( 1| ), ( 2 | ), , ( | )py k k y k k y k N k                 (26b) 
( | ), ( 1| ), , ( 1| )cu k k u k k u k N k                 (26c) 
The cost function for motion prediction of EC is defined by 
1
2 2
1 0
( ) || ( | ) || || ( | ) ||
p cN N
Q R
i j
k y k i k u k j k

 
              (27) 
where Q is the output weighting matrix, and R is the control 
variation weighting matrix. 
Finally, the motion prediction and planning problem of EC 
can be expressed as 
( )
( ) argmin ( )
k
k k

  
u
u                              (28) 
1 2 3
min max
min max
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，
 
where minu  and maxu are the minimum and maximum constraints 
of u, minu and maxu  are the minimum and maximum 
constraints of u . After solving the multi-constraint 
optimization problem, the sequence of optimal input increments 
is obtained. 
( ) [ ( | ), ( 1 | ), , ( 1 | )]ck u k k u k k u k N k
           u  (29) 
Then, the control output at the time step k can be calculated. 
( | ) ( 1 | 1) ( | )u k k u k k u k k                      (30) 
Furthermore, the state vector can be updated according to Eq. 
(23). In another words, the motion prediction of EC is realized. 
At the next time step 1k  , a new optimization is solved over a 
shifted prediction horizon with the updated state ( 1| 1)x k k  . 
The aforementioned optimization problem with multi-constraints 
can be solved by the fmincon function in MATLAB simulation 
environment. 
VI. TESTING RESULTS AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
In this section, two testing scenarios are designed to evaluate 
the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed human-like 
decision making framework for AVs. All the driving scenarios 
are built and tested on the MATLAB-Simulink platform. 
A. Scenario A 
As Fig. 7 shows, Scenario A is a merging maneuver on a 
highway. In this scenario, EC has to change lanes due to the 
impending ending of the current lane. However, there exits an 
AC on the left lane. The decision making of EC must consider 
the reaction behavior of AC. In addition, the different driving 
styles of EC have significant effects on decision making. At the 
initial moment, the longitudinal velocities of EC and AC are 20 
m/s and 15 m/s, and the initial gap between EC and AC is 2 m 
(EC is in front of AC). The testing results are demonstrated in 
Figs. 8-10 and Table III. 
 
Fig. 7.  Testing Scenario A. 
It can be seen that the different driving styles and different 
decision-making strategies would lead to different testing results 
of decision making and motion planning. If EC is aggressive, EC 
would choose a sudden large acceleration to increase the gap 
immediately. Then, a lane-change behavior would be conducted.  
If the driving style of EC is normal, EC would not speed up with 
a large acceleration. It would like to accelerate progressively and 
increase the gap. When the gap is large enough, a lane-change 
maneuver would be carried out. In contrast, it would cause the 
opposite decision-making result if EC is conservative. It can be 
seen from Fig. 10 that EC would choose deceleration to 
guarantee drive safety. When EC moves close to the end of the 
current lane, the velocity of EC is much smaller than that of AC. 
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It is safe enough for EC to perform a merging maneuver. From 
Table III, it can also be found that aggressive mode has the 
smallest decision-making time and largest velocity for lane 
change, which indicates that aggressive mode cares more about 
travel efficiency. However, the conservative mode would spend 
more time decelerating to improve drive safety. 
  
 
 
Fig. 8.  Testing results of decision making considering different driving styles in 
Scenario A. 
TABLE III 
TEST RESULTS OF DECISION MAKING IN SCENARIO A 
Testing 
Parameters 
Aggressive Normal Conservative 
NE SE NE SE NE SE 
ct / s 2.24 2.72 5.04 5.36 7.00 7.18 
ct
s / m 13.77 16.46 18.06 18.86 -1.37 -1.99 
, c
EC
x tv / (m/s) 24.15 24.83 23.25 23.40 17.03 11.07 
, c
AC
x tv / (m/s) 18.66 19.17 20.76 20.91 21.49 21.52 
where ct  is the time of lane-change decision making, cts  is the gap between EC 
and AC at the time ct . , c
EC
x tv  and , c
AC
x tv  are the velocities of EC and AC at the time 
ct . NE denotes Nash Equilibrium and SE denotes Stackelberg Equilibrium. 
 
 
Fig. 9.  Testing results of s  in Scenario A. 
Nash Equilibrium (NE) and Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) are 
two different noncooperative game strategies for lane-change 
decision making. In NE, EC and AC are two equal and 
independent players. Both EC and AC aim to minimize their own 
cost functions of decision making. However, EC is the lead 
player in SE and AC is a follower player, the behavior of AC will 
affect the decision making of EC. Compared with NE, SE has a 
larger safe gap when performing a merging maneuver, which  
indicates that SE shows more  consideration for safety in the 
decision-making process since the behavior of AC is fed back to 
the decision making of EC. In summary, SE decision making is 
more human-like, since human driver would adjust his decision 
making according to the behaviors of the surrounding vehicles. 
 
 
Fig. 10.  Testing results of velocities in Scenario A. 
B. Scenario B 
Scenario B is an overtaking maneuver on a curved highway 
with three lanes. As Fig. 11 shows, both LC and EC move on the 
middle lane. Since LC moves with a slow velocity, EC has to a 
make decision, slowing down to maintain a safe distance and 
following LC on the current lane or changing lanes to overtake. 
If EC chooses to change lanes, which side should be selected, the 
left side or the right side? AC1 and AC2 are moving on the left 
and right lanes. The behaviors of both AC1 and AC2 must be 
taken into consideration in the decision-making process of EC. 
At the initial moment, the longitudinal velocities of LC, EC, AC1 
and AC2 are set as 15 m/s, 20 m/s, 15 m/s and 13 m/s. The initial 
position coordinates of LC, EC, AC1 and AC2 are (62, 0.95), (12, 
0.04), (10, 4.03), and (15, -3.94). Figs. 12-14 and Table IV show 
the detailed testing results under the different driving styles of 
EC and different decision-making strategies. 
 
Fig. 11.  Testing Scenario B. 
TABLE IV 
TEST RESULTS OF DECISION MAKING IN SCENARIO B 
Testing 
Parameters 
Aggressive Normal Conservative 
NE SE NE SE NE SE 
ct / s 2.98 3.44 3.90 4.20 - - 
1
ct
s / m 28.66 33.32 25.53 26.20 - - 
2
ct
s / m 26.22 31.21 22.55 24.06 - - 
, c
EC
x tv / (m/s) 27.03 27.22 23.43 23.44 - - 
1
, c
AC
x tv / (m/s) 16.96 17.22 20.11 20.31 - - 
2
, c
AC
x tv / (m/s) 16.23 16.52 19.82 20.04 - - 
where ct  is the time of lane-change decision making, ( 1, 2)c
i
ts i   denotes the 
gap between EC and ACi ( 1,2)i  at the time ct . , c
EC
x tv  and , ( 1, 2)c
ACi
x tv i   denote 
the velocities of EC and ACi ( 1,2)i   at the time ct . 
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In this scenario, we also study the effect of the different 
driving styles on decision making for EC. Similar to Scenario A, 
if EC’s driving style is set as aggressive, to improve travel 
efficiency, EC would speed up with a large acceleration and 
spend the shortest time finishing the overtaking process. If EC’s 
driving style is set as normal, it would take more time to 
accelerate to create a larger safe gap for overtaking. However, if 
EC’s driving style is set as conservative, EC prefers to decelerate 
to keep a larger safe distance between the other obstacle cars. 
Therefore, we can see from Figs 12 and 13 that EC does not 
change lanes at 10s in spite of the large gap of more than 20m. To 
explain this situation according to the decision-making model, 
the cost function of the lane-change for EC with a conservative 
driving style is larger than that of lane-keeping at this moment. In 
other words, EC with the conservative driving style cares more 
about drive safety rather than travel efficiency. In addition, we 
can see from Fig. 12 that EC would choose the left-side lane 
change due to the smaller cost generated for the left lane. Similar 
to Scenario A, it can be seen from Table IV that SE has larger ct  
and 
c
i
ts  value than NE, which indicates that SE shows more 
consideration of safety for EC in the process of decision making. 
 
 
 
Fig. 12.  Testing results of decision making considering different driving styles in 
Scenario B. 
   
 
Fig. 13.  Testing results of s  in Scenario B. 
 
 
Fig. 14.  Testing results of velocities in Scenario B. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS  
This paper presents a human-like decision making 
framework for AVs. Different driving styles associated with 
drive safety, ride comfort and travel efficiency are defined for 
AVs. Based on the decision-making model considering the 
different driving styles and social interaction characteristics, 
Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg game theory are utilized to 
address the noncooperative decision making problem. In 
addition, the potential field method and MPC are used to plan 
the collision-avoidance path and provide predicted motion 
states for the human-like decision making module. Finally, two 
testing scenarios are established to evaluate the performance of 
the decision-making framework. The testing results indicates 
that the developed framework is able to make reasonable 
decisions under different driving styles, which is human-like 
and can provide personalized choices for different passengers.  
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